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ABSTRACT 
 
In a company with defined benefit plans, pension assets often represent a sizable portfolio of 
financial assets.  The intention is to examine whether pension tax arbitrage has the potential to add 
value to the sponsoring corporation with secondary benefits to plan participants, through a less 
volatile pension fund. To implement the arbitrage, it is recommended that the plans shift all assets to 
bonds.  Replacing stocks with bonds reduces the risk of the firm, and the benefit stems from the 
creation of an additional tax deduction on the payment of interest with no increase in firm risk. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n the early 1980s, Fischer Black and Irwin Tepper developed an arbitrage strategy for companies with 
defined benefit pension plans. To implement the arbitrage, both papers recommended that the plans shift 
all assets to bonds.  The arbitrage would be created when the company exactly offset the reduced risk in 
the pension fund with a tax-advantaged move to more risk in either the capital structure [Black 1980] or more risk in 
the shareholder‘s personal portfolio [Tepper1981]. This paper focuses on Black‘s model and asks if its 
implementation is viable for the global community. 
 
Black‘s model can be presented in two simple steps.  First, stocks in the pension fund are sold and bonds are 
purchased.  Replacing stocks with bonds reduces the risk of the firm.  Second, the risk reduction through the pension 
fund is offset in the capital structure by issuing debt and buying back the firm‘s stock (this is similar to swapping 
pension fund stocks to corporate stocks).  Replacing equity in the capital structure with debt increases financial 
leverage and increases the firm‘s risk.  If these two transactions are implemented with correct proportions, the risk of 
the firm is unchanged.  The benefit stems from the creation of an additional tax deduction on the payment of interest 
with no increase in firm risk.  
 
For two decades, the proposed strategy ignited much controversy but had little apparent impact on the asset 
allocation strategy of defined benefit pension plans [Copeland, et al, 2005].  Since 2000, however, the strategy has 
begun to receive recognition in the academic literature [Dammon et al 2004, Franks 2000, Gould et al. 2003].  In 
2001, the British pharmaceutical retailer, Boots, implemented the arbitrage strategy – selling stocks in its pension fund 
and replacing these stocks with bonds [Gold and Hudson 2003].  Although stocks are expected to earn more in than 
bonds in the long run, Boots can realize the greater return by using the extra debt capacity (created through the 
pension fund transaction) to buy its own stock.  In addition to creating an interest tax deduction with no additional 
risk, the implementation of the arbitrage also has these other potential benefits: 
 
 Lower management fees 
 More entrepreneurial incentive, stemming from more debt usage 
 Fortified protection of plan participants 
 
It follows that tax arbitrage‘s growing acceptance in the U.S. and U.K. has potential for implementation by 
corporations in other countries.   
 
I 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The arbitrage strategy for companies with defined benefit plans as developed by Fisher Black (1980) and 
Irwin Tepper (1981) was based on shifting assets from stocks to bonds.  The arbitrage would be created and become 
beneficial when the company exactly offset the reduced risk in the pension fund with a tax-advantaged move from 
stock with higher risk to lower risk bond benefiting either capital structure [Black 1980] and/or the shareholder‘s 
personal portfolio [Tepper 1981]. 
 
The underlying premise for the arbitrage theory is that the performance of pension assets affects corporate 
cash flows much like corporate assets.   While the pension assets are in a trust that technically belongs to the 
beneficiaries, the corporation is ultimately responsible for making up any deficiencies in the pension plan as illustrated 
in the recent market cycle.  The strong equity market in the late 1990s provided a first hand example of how closely 
contributions were linked to pension performance, as many firms took a long ―holiday‖ from any contributions.  The 
sharp downturn in early 2000 provided the opposite examples, as pension funds had to increase contributions, just 
when the firm could least afford them.   
 
Given that defined benefit pension assets affect cash flows much like corporate assets, the next condition is 
that the equity markets must recognize the returns from pension assets. The stock price of the pension sponsor should 
increase with strong pension asset performance, and fall when the fund experiences losses. A stream of literature over 
three decades [Oldfield 1977, Feldstein et al. 1981, Daley 1984, Landsman 1986, Barth et al. 1991, Barth et al 1992, 
Coronado et al. 2003] supports the idea that the market impounds pension performance.   
 
 After the Oldfield (1997) and Feldstein (1981) articles, interest in pension valuation moved to the accounting 
arena.  Accounting questions stemmed from the new measurement standards required by Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 87
1
, Employers‘ Accounting for Pensions, researchers started to investigate the usefulness of 
the information provided. The stream of accounting research [Daley 1984, Landsman 1986, Barth 1991, and Barth et 
al 1992] continued to find that pension variables had a statistically and economically significant impact on the market 
capitalization of the firm, whether the measures were assets or liabilities or capitalized flows, such as pension 
expense. 
 
The findings generally indicate that each dollar of pension assets creates a dollar of market value.  In fact, 
this result is more than would be expected in theory.  Since pension contributions are tax deductible, only $1 (1-Tax 
rate) or $0.6, assuming a 40 percent tax rate is required to create $1 of pension assets.  In sum, it appears the market 
does impound asset value into the valuation of the company‘s equity – even more value is assigned that would be 
predicted in theory [Gold et al. 2003].   Similarly, arguments in defense of arbitrage strategy were presented by Franks 
(2003) and Dammon, Spratt, and Zhang (2004). 
 
With the two major conditions for effective arbitrage being met, firms still have not implemented the 
strategy.  The reason does not appear to be market driven, but instead the actuarial measurement system has promoted 
holding equities in the pension fund since equities permit a greater return assumption which in turn decreases the 
measurement of the funding needed to meet the liability [Zion 2001].  
 
Gordon and Jarvis (2003) looked at the U.K. pension plan and arbitrage strategy, and compared the U.K. plan 
to the U.S. plan, and the UK plan trustees have a key role with significant powers to use in the interests of the plan 
beneficiaries, which may conflict with the employer interests. Gold and Hudson (2003) investigate arbitrage strategy 
used by the British Boots, Pharmaceutical retailer, and report that the lower return from bonds forced Boots to 
increase its contributions to the plan in the future years, the firm ignored the lower annual management cost associated 
with bonds versus stocks. 
 
Many other reports looked at the OECD pension assets [Financial Economics and Pensions Actuaries 2003], 
and pension plans in various countries, as listed in the references, but none dealt with the arbitrage strategy in practical 
aspects. The main contribution of this paper to the current body of literature is to present the practical implications of 
arbitrage strategy.       
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THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
 
 In a company with defined benefit plans, pension assets often represent a sizable portfolio of financial assets.  
In the U.S., pension assets are about 14 percent of the market capitalization of the firm‘s stock, with some company‘s 
having a much larger proportion.  For example, Ford Motor Company‘s pension assets are over 1.5 times the market 
value of its stock and General Motors pension assets represent an even greater proportion, with pension assets over 
two times the market value of its stock.  In the U.S., the average asset allocation is about 60 percent stocks and 40 
percent bonds, with a growing proportion of stocks allocated to international equities. This paper explores the 
potential valuation impact of changing the risk profile of the pension fund.  
 
The significance of changing the risk profile of pension assets is reflected in the answers to these questions.  
Does the risk of the pension fund, and the change in that risk, affect the risk of the company?  That is, do the stock and 
bond markets treat pension assets like traditional corporate assets and is the pension fund of sufficient size to have a 
meaningful impact?  Second, does the tax structure of the specific country permit defined benefit sponsors to 
implement a tax arbitrage, taking advantage of the differential between the tax treatment of income from pension 
assets and the tax treatment of income from corporate assets? 
 
The term defined contribution and defined benefit are used in relation to the pension plan‘s features.  In a 
defined contribution, the amount of the pension you receive is not set in advance.  Instead, you and your employer 
contribute a set amount to the plan, usually as a percentage of earnings. Defined benefit plans, based on OECD/IASB 
definition (2003), are those where benefits are predefined in relation to the worker‘s salary and length of employment.  
Companies that sponsor defined benefit pension plans are faced with two problems: those related to the presence of 
promises and guarantees and those related to adverse demographic and economic developments. Regardless of 
whether defined benefit pension plans are funded internally or through a pension fund, these two problems and others, 
such as investment funding regulations, condition solvency and risk management in occupational pension plans, 
influence the outcomes. 
 
Increasing life expectancy and population ageing represent a growing cost for final salary and career average 
salary plans.  This is a long term problem and difficult to deal with because it requires either reducing benefits or 
increasing retirement age.  Investment risk, on the other hand, is very much a short-term problem and one that affects 
all employers that sponsor defined benefit plans, regardless of type.  Three years of stock market declines, from 2001-
2003 and current (2005) stagnant market, have dented severely the funding level of defined benefit plans in most 
OECD countries.  In addition, fall in discount rates have raised the level of pension liabilities valued using market 
principles.  According to OECD (2003) report, the fall in funding levels has been particularly dramatic in countries 
where pension funds invest heavily in equities, such as Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.  According to one risk rating firm, funding levels are now well below 100 percent in some 
occupational plans in these countries.        
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine if pension tax arbitrage has the potential to add value to the 
sponsoring corporation with secondary benefits to plan participants, through a less volatile pension fund.  While the 
arbitrage presents a risk-free gain, the implementation of the arbitrage takes place in a controversial landscape, where 
retirees are facing inadequate pension assets as described by Harrington (2004) and the accounting system is trying to 
come to terms with measurement issues, discussed in FAS 132 (revised) and the upcoming ruling by IAS 19.  The 
defined benefit plan is a separate legal entity of corporate sponsor.  Corporations select trustees and management 
team, and may influence the direction of investment policy.  At the same time, corporations bear the risk of 
investments if investments returns miss the target returns. Of course, corporations may benefit from higher than 
expected investment returns (exceeding target returns) by helping companies to reduce contributions to plans.    
 
 In order to address arbitrage strategy and its benefit, 19 countries with some form of occupational pension 
plan (typically defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC)) were selected for preliminary investigation. After 
an in-depth review of their corporate pension plans, 12 countries were eliminated because their plans are not defined 
benefit, do not pre-fund the pension fund, or have the pension plan structured to share risk between the company and 
the beneficiary. The final 8 countries involved in this study presented with (*) below.   
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Argentina Denmark* Japan* Sweden 
Australia Finland Mexico Switzerland 
Brazil* France Netherlands United Kingdom* 
Belgium* Germany Norway* United States* 
Canada* Italy South Korea  
 
 
Second, an attempt has been made to explain in brief, pension plans in each of the selected countries and the 
rest in Appendix A, and as much as possible, to point out their differences with the United States pension plans 
policies.  Third, an arbitrage model based on Black‘s proposal, including the treatment of risk and return, is presented. 
Fourth, a form of country analysis of the tax arbitrage strategy was developed.  The tax rate used here is from KPMG 
International report 2004; the interest rates are selected from various internet-based sources. Within this context, we 
addressed four questions related to tax arbitrage viability. Finally, the potential benefits for the countries are 
summarized.  A conclusion and recommendations follow. 
 
GLOBAL PENSION PLANS 
 
 An attempt has been made here to briefly describe pension plans for 6 out of 19 selected countries in this 
study.  The six have attributes that meet the basic criteria of tax arbitrage.  The remaining pension plans were 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
United Kingdom Pension Plan Structure  
 
The U.K. defined benefit (DB) pension plan is very similar to that of the United States. They both have large 
employer-sponsored plans providing pension benefits defined in relation to employee earnings that are set up under 
legislation where the employer makes contributions that are invested to cover the cost of benefits accruing and to 
offset deficits arising.  The key similarity between the U.K. and the U.S. is that both have: many large occupational 
DB plans, standard to provide benefits linked to compensation DB plans, sponsoring employer typically pays balance 
of cost, and traditional approach to funding is the same, that is, the projected unit discounting liabilities as expected 
returns on assets.  The key differences is that:  the U.K. pension vest after two years versus the U.S. five years, and in 
the U.K. the total accrued pension is indexed to consumer price inflation both in deferment and payment.   Another 
important difference is the fact that the U.K. plan trustees have a key role with significant powers that they are in 
theory obliged to use in the interests of the plan beneficiaries.  They can act in conflict with the employer [Gordon and 
Jarvis 2003]. 
 
 A statistical publication by OECD report the total OECD pension assets by member country as follow:  
 
 
Table 1 
Oecd Pension Assets By Member Country 
(Percentage of GDP Based on 2001) 
 
United States  75   United Kingdom 85   Netherlands 113  
Japan   21  Australia  62  Canada    48  
Others Average  52 
Source:  Financial Economics and Pension Actuaries: The U.K. Experience, June 2003. 
 
 
Bear in mind that the size of GDP in the United States is far larger than all other nations including Japan and 
China. The U.K. pension funds are estimated at approximately $1.4 trillion in 2004.  Furthermore, as in the United 
States, unlike most of continental Europe, the U.K. private-sector provision forms a significant supplement to state 
provision.  In the U.K., it accounts for 40 percent of all retirement income and covers 10 million employees. Referring 
to Russell Mellon CAPS statistics, Gordon and Jarvis (2003) suggest that the U.K. pension plans invest 75 percent in 
equities and 10 percent in bonds compared with 60 percent in equities and 30 percent in bonds for the United States.   
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Japanese Pension Plan Structure  
 
Unlike U.S. 401K plans, contributions to the company plans must be made entirely by employer up to the 
limit of ¥216,000 per year.  If the employer does not have a defined benefit (DB) plan, the contribution limit doubled 
to ¥432,000 per year.  Self-employed individuals may contribute up to ¥816,000 per year to individual plan.   
Individuals who are not covered by either a DB or DC plan at their company may contribute up to ¥180,000 per year 
to an individual plan [Investment Company Institute 2001]. 
 
 Contributions to plans are tax-exempt.  Plan administrators select the investment options for company plans.  
Plans must include at least three investment options from:  mutual funds, investment trusts, savings products, 
government bonds, equities, and insurance products.  Real property, real estate, financial futures and commodity 
futures are not permissible investment options.   Individuals who have participated in a plan for more than 10 years are 
eligible for distributions at age 60. The eligible age for distributions increases on a sliding scale to 65 for individuals 
who have participated in a plan for less than 10 years.   Participants who die or are severely disabled are eligible to 
receive distributions regardless of their age.  Distributions may be made in the form of an annuity or a lump-sum 
payment.   If a participant participates in the plan for less than three years, contributions must be lump sum 
[Investment Company Institute 2001/2004].  
 
Canadian Pension Plan Structure 
 
In a defined benefit plan, you are promised a monthly pension income that is determined by a formula, such 
as a combination of your earnings, job classification and the length of time you worked for the employer.  It is 
generally the employer‘s responsibility to ensure that sufficient funds are available to pay your pension when you 
retire. The employer assumes the risk of investing all contributions wisely to guarantee the future value of your 
pension. In Canada, most large employers offer pension plans to their employees.   Sometimes, a number of 
employers in an industry will participate in a plan together, often in collaboration with a union.  You are usually 
qualified to join within two years of starting continuous employment.  Plans can be mandatory or optional.  
 
 The defined benefit pension amount depends on your plan‘s benefit formula.  For example, you may receive 
a pension up to two percent of your earnings fro each year of services.   Once you received your pension, the income 
is taxable.  This is because no tax was paid on the funds while you were making contributions. The four defined 
benefit formulas are [Canada 2004, Nelson 1999]: 
 
1. A flat amount formula, which provides a flat benefit unrelated to earnings or services. 
2. A flat percentage of earnings formula, which provides a benefit related to earnings but which does not reflect 
services.  
3. A flat amount per year of service formula, which reflects service but not earnings. 
4. A percentage of earnings per year of services formula, which reflects both earnings and service. 
 
The United States Pension Plan Structure  
 
In the United States the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provides the legal governance 
for pension plans. The benefits in most traditional defined benefit plans are protected, within certain limitations, by 
federal insurance provided through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).  The structure of plans is 
typically based on a plan formula that considers such factors as salary and service — for example, 1 percent of 
average salary for the last 5 years of employment for every year of service with an employer.  
 
Brazilian Pension Plan Structure  
 
The Brazilian law defines two different types of pension plan: entidades fechadas and abertas de previdencia 
privada. Entidades fechadas are occupational pension plans, sponsored by corporations and until recently only for 
organization with more than 100 employees. They are non-profit organization by definition under the Ministry of 
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Social security. Entidade aberta de providencia privada are majority profit organizations run by commercial banks and 
insurance companies. 
 
 During 70‘s and 80‘s almost all plans were defined benefit plans. Today the pension funds supported by the 
private sector outnumbers the ones from the government sector, and is in both defines contribution and defined 
benefits plans. In the private sector, approximately 30 percent are defined benefit plans and 70 percent are defined 
contribution plans or combination of both.  Nearly 40 percent of these plans are only the employer responsible for the 
funding of the plan [Lopes 1999]. 
 
Belgium Pension Plan Structure  
 
In Belgium, as in most European countries, an individual‘s total retirement income is decided according to 
three sources (pillars).  The defined benefit plan is known as second pillar, sponsored at the company or sector level 
for the employees of that company.  In Belgium, many employers provide supplementary pension schemes mostly in 
the form of DB. In total, 40 percent of the working population have occupational pension sponsored by their 
employers.   There is an attempt to expand the scope of DB plans by Belgium government [Wyatt 2005, SAP 2005].        
 
THE MODEL 
 
The focus in this paper is on the arbitrage proposed by Black. Tepper‘s model requires changes at the 
personal level; with Black‘s proposal the arbitrage is fully implemented at the corporate level. Consider a U.S. 
corporation that has its pension assets entirely invested in stocks.  The corporation is in the 40 percent tax bracket and 
all its contributions to the pension fund are fully deductible; for example, a $1 contribution costs the corporation $1 
(1-0.4), or a $0.60 net cash outflow, but creates $1 of pension assets.  The .6:1 relationship is important for the 
arbitrage proportions between the capital structure and the pension fund -- $0.60 change in the capital structure offsets 
a $1.00 change in the pension fund.  Assume the transaction below is started with moving pension assets from equities 
($100 in the example) and using the proceeds to buy bonds.  The change in risk in the pension fund is exactly offset in 
the capital structure by issuing $60 of debt and using the proceeds to repurchase $60 of corporate stock, thus: to assess 
the arbitrage, the transaction is evaluated in terms of risk and return. 
 
Table 2 
 Capital Structure      Pension Fund 
 
Issue (sell) debt ($60 at 6%)      Buy bonds ($100) 
Buy outstanding stock ($60)     Sell equities ($100) 
 
 
Risk 
 
Reduced risk in the pension fund (increasing a fixed income cash flow in exchange for an equity residual 
cash flow) offset by increasing the risk in the capital structure (increasing the outflow of fixed debt costs and 
decreasing the outflow of equity residual costs).  In other words, the pension fund increases fixed income cash inflows 
and the capital structure increases fixed income cash outflows; the pension fund decreases equity inflows and the 
capital structure decreases equity outflows.  In summary, increases in the holding of each security are exactly offset by 
a short position in that security. 
 
Return 
 
The arbitrage produces an almost certain increase in cash flows, stemming from tax savings.  In the capital 
structure the corporation receives a tax deduction from the interest payment of $60 x 0.06 x 0.4 = $2.40.  Since the 
payment of dividends is not tax deductible, there is no loss of tax deduction from buying back outstanding stock.  And 
the pension returns are not taxed.  Therefore, the firm realizes a net gain of $2.40 with no increase in risk. 
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COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF THE TAX ARBITRAGE STRATEGY 
 
The tax arbitrage model was introduced in the U.S. and most of the studies of the market‘s impounding 
pension returns have been conducted in the U.S. markets.  However, the first public move to an all bond position, 
based on Black‘s arbitrage strategy has been in the U.K. market with Boots, Britain‘s largest retail pharmacy [Gold 
2003].  The arbitrage strategy clearly has application outside the U.S. but the question this paper addresses is how 
widespread is the prospective application and what are the relative benefits in each country. 
 
The developed countries are selected because defined benefit pensions will have had sufficient time to 
develop into an economic force in the more industrialized countries.  From this sample we then address whether the 
tax arbitrage strategy is viable.  If viable, the final step is then to evaluate the impact of implementing the tax arbitrage 
in the specific countries. 
 
Is Pension Tax Arbitrage Viable? 
 
To determine viability, the paper asked the following four questions, and based on the answers and 
investigations, the seven finalists were selected that complied with the four questions asked: 
 
1. Does the country have defined benefit pension plans? 
2. Are the plans pre-funded (as opposed to pay as you go)? 
3. Are the returns on pension assets exempt from taxation? 
4. Does a corporation‘s payment of interest to creditors have a tax advantage relative to the payment of 
dividends to shareholders?  Here we assume that this is the case. 
 
COUNTRY COMPARISON OF THE BENEFITS 
 
The data in Table 3 reflect tax rates and interest rates for the selected countries.  The tax rates were obtained 
from KPMG‘s Corporate Tax Rates Survey with rates effective January 1, 2004 [2004 KPM International].  Because 
of difficulty in obtaining specifics of tax treatment, the assumption was made that the tax rate for the deduction of 
pension contributions was equivalent to the tax rate for the interest deduction.  
 
Corporate interest rate data was not readily available in all sample countries.  Therefore, a uniform estimation 
process was applied. The estimation of the corporate rate began with the 10-year rate for the government bonds which 
were then ―grossed up‖ by the proportionate quality yield spread.  For example, the 10-year Brazilian government rate 
as of March 18, 2005 was 7.875 percent [http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates].  The estimated quality spread is 
derived from the May 17, 2005 U.S. market [http://bonds.yahoo.com/rates.html] where the 10Year S&P Corporate 
rate is 4.63 percent and the 10-year Treasury is 4.09 percent.  The quality factor, which converts from the government 
rate to the Corporate rate is therefore 4.63%/4.09% = 1.132.  This rate then applied to  
 
Table 4 provides a comparative analysis of the selected countries in terms of the annual cash savings from 
implementation of the pension tax arbitrage strategy.  Column 1 provides the percentage to be applied to the dollars of 
pension assets shifted from stocks to bonds. Column 2 ranks the countries in terms of annual benefit. Column 3 
analyses the tax rate impact of the arbitrage model, separate from the interest rate impact.  
 
The annual cash flow benefits are much greater for Brazil than for the other countries.  The results are largely 
driven by high interest rates. Brazil has the highest interest rate and generates the greatest cash flows benefits; Japan 
has the lowest interest rate and has the smallest cash flow benefits. 
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Table 3 
Interest Rate And Tax Rate Information 
 For Pension Arbitrage 
 
 Tax Rate on: Tax Rate on:  
Selected Corporate Interest Interest Rate 
Countries Contribution to Payment Investment Grade 
 Pension Plan  Corporate 
Belgium 0.340 0.340 0.043 
Brazil 0.340 0.340 0.089 
Canada 0.366 0.366 0.048 
Denmark 0.300 0.300 0.043 
Japan 0.420 0.420 0.015 
Norway 0.280 0.280 0.045 
UK 0.300 0.300 0.054 
US 0.400 0.400 0.056 
Sources for Interest Rates:  US, UK, Brazil, Japan http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates 
Canada http://www.econstats.com/r/rcan_ew3.htm ; Norway http://www.econstats.com/r/rnor_ew3.htm 
Belgium and Denmark http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html 
All tax rate information was obtained from KPMG International Survey 2004.   
Brazilian rate by multiplying the Brazilian government rate by 1.132 to yield an estimate of the Brazilian corporate rate 7.875% x 
1.132 = 8.915%.   
 
 
Table 4 
Value Creation From Pension Tax Arbitrage 
 
Selected Countries Cash Savings From 
Reallocation  % 
(1) 
Ranking of Savings 
 
(2) 
Tax Impact  % 
 
(3) 
Belgium 0.955  5 22.44  
Brazil 1.994  1 22.44  
Canada 1.111  4 23.20  
Denmark 0.908  6 21.00  
Japan 0.358  8 24.36  
Norway 0.901  7 20.16  
U.K. 1.129  3 21.00  
U.S. 1.348  2 24.00  
 
 
The value creation is based on the model described previously: 
 
Annual Cash Flow Savings = {[(1-Tx) * Tx] * (I) * PA} 
 
Where: Tx is the tax rate, I is the interest rate, PA is the dollar value of pension assets reallocated. 
 
Column (1) is the product of the first 3 terms, {[(1-Tx)(Tx)] (I)}, yielding the percentage to be applied to the dollar 
value of pension assets reallocated.  And Column (3) is the product of the first two terms, [(1-Tx)(Tx)] = (Tx – Tx2)  
 
The impact of the corporate tax rate is surprisingly small because of two offsetting functions.  While the 
corporate tax rate directly increases the tax benefits, it also reduces the proportionate impact of a change in pension 
assets on capital structure.  If, for instance, the tax rate is 40 percent, the net cost of a $1.00 contribution to the pension 
fund is $.60 to the contributing pension sponsor. Therefore, a change in asset allocation of $1.00 of pension assets can 
be offset by a change in $.60 in the capital structure.  As noted, the tax rate impact = (Tx – Tx2).  As a result the tax 
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rate impact is a non-linear function of tax rates.  The tax impact is the greatest for a tax rate of 50 percent with the 
impact decreasing as tax rates decrease.   
 
In our model, the interest rates are the dominant factor in value creation.  Black‘s pension tax arbitrage model 
[Black 1981] employs a different approach. Black capitalizes the cash flows by dividing by the after tax interest rate, 
or I (1-Tx), resulting in an increase in market value of: 
 
Black‘s Value Creation = 
)1(
}*)(*]*)1{[(
x
xx
Ti
PAiTT


= (T * PA) 
 
Therefore, for Black‘s model, the tax rate was the sole determinant.  For this study, annual cash flows are 
deemed a superior measure. The multinational community displays instability of tax rates and regulations which 
determine if arbitrage conditions apply.  Treating the cash flows as perpetuity is inappropriate given such instability.   
 
Overall, the analysis indicates that the tax arbitrage strategy does not apply in many countries.  But for those 
where pension tax arbitrage is viable, the advantages are considerable – yielding an annual cash flow advantage 
between 90 and 199 basis points, with Japan‘s low interest rates generating a relatively small cash inflow of only 36 
basis points of the pension assets reallocated. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 The implementation of the pension tax arbitrage strategy must address the inability of the investing public to 
see beyond the pension plan itself.  Relative to bonds, stocks are a long-term security, with higher expected returns.  
On its face, stocks seem a superior asset for pensions. But, as has been demonstrated, if the pension fund is seen 
within the context of the overall firm, investing the pension assets in bonds provides a no-risk method for increasing 
the rate of return to the firm‘s shareholders.  Perhaps, the greater disclosure of economic information, as required by 
FAS 132 (revised) and by IAS 19 will provide a greater understanding by the investing public and pave the way for a 
better understanding of what pension tax arbitrage can accomplish. 
 
 The benefits are certainly available, as demonstrated in Table 4.  It appears that the annual cash flow from 
pension arbitrage is greater for countries with higher interest rate levels.  The impact of tax rate is surprisingly small 
because while the corporate tax rate directly increases the tax benefits, it reduces the proportionate impact of a change 
in pension assets on capital structure.  However, the tax impact is the greatest for a tax rate of 50 percent with the 
impact decreasing as tax rates decrease.    
 
Further research might explore other issues related to the cash flows stemming from tax arbitrage. A major 
component is the stability of the national regulations regarding defined benefit funds; another area of research 
involves a more specific analysis of the on-going stability of the tax treatment of interest, dividends, and pension 
contributions. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
France  
 
Contributions are tax deductible and pensions are taxed as income.  Two types of pension contribution plans 
exist in France. The Public Earnings- Related Pensions are financed by contributions, but government grants variable 
subsidies.  The pension age is 60 for both men and women, but currently a minimum of 40 years contributions is 
required. Public earnings-related benefits amounted to 72.8 percent of the total old-age benefits. The Public Flat-Rate 
Pensions comprises both means-tested flat pensions and earning-related pensions.  Flat-rate pensions are financed by 
contributions and state subsidy. The entitlement age is 65 for both males and females.  The minimum monthly 
allowance was E540 (45 percent of the average annual wage in manufacturing), and the means-tested benefits 
amounted to 3.7 percent of the total old-age benefits.   
International Business & Economics Research Journal – April 2007                                          Volume 6, Number 4 
 24 
The implicit replacement rate or the ratio of average pension to average wage is 56 percent.   Pension from 
private savings and life insurance is voluntary and premiums are partially tax deductible. Mandatory occupational 
pension schemes are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis (PAYG) plus voluntary capital-funded schemes. PAYG 
supplementary benefits amounted to 21.7 percent of total old-age benefits [International Reform Monitor 2004].  
 
Italy  
 
 Rarely do employers use pension plan in Italy because the Social Security is so good. Thus, neither defined 
benefit or contribution would be used.  Workers with 35 years on the job can retire if they are at least 57.  For those 
with less than 35 years of work, the benefit is at a reduced rate (for example, for 31 years of service, the reduced rate 
is 90 percent of salary).  Before a series of changes introduced in 1995, there was no age requirement, and some 
government workers were eligible to retire after as little as 15 years on the job.  These early retirement laws are more 
lax than in the rest of Europe.  According to European Union (EU) statistics, only 28 percent of Italian aged 55-64 
works, compared with 38 percent in Germany and an average of 39 percent in the Union 
[http://www.enepri.org/Paperstrapen/JOHNTURNER.doc, and http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/prindoc]. The 
system is also strained by the special privileges enjoyed by some state workers, like employees of Sicily‘s regional 
government who can retire after 25 years on the job if they are male and after 20 years if they are female.  Italy‘s 
problem is more acute by the fact that only 55 percent of Italian aged 15-64 works, compare with a EU average of 64 
percent.   Italy‘s quality of life among the best in the world, its pension system is beginning to feel the effects of 
accommodating its aging population. 
 
 Italy spends around 14 percent of GDP on pensions, one of the highest levels in Europe. The Italian 
Parliament voted in the late July 2004 to increase the Italian retirement age to 60 and to channel worker 
unemployment indemnity payments, known as trattamento a fine rapporto (TFR), into pension plans.   This legislation 
has not been written into law.  Under the present system, 7 percent of an employee‘s salary goes into the TFR system.  
This guarantees a return approximate to inflation and is used by Italian as a safety net in the case of unemployment 
[http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc]. 
 
Germany   
 
Germany is known as ―the country of un-funded pension plans.  It is because German tax legislation 
historically favored defined benefit (DB) pension plan in the form of direct pension commitments.   These plans do 
not require any form of funding at all, but German companies have to show a pension liability in their books.  
Essentially, pension obligations are funded ―internally‖ by the aggregate of all company assets.  A large part of the 
existing pension liabilities for direct commitments (approximately 40 percent) has been matched with external 
investments, either in the form of insurance policies or in the form of mixed bond and equity portfolios.  However, 
these are essentially company assets and may be used for other purposes than paying pensions.  Like France, Germany 
companies use pay-as-you-go schemes. 
 
 The new German tax legislation in 2001 and 2004 made the German company pension system even more 
complicated.   With the introduction of Pensionsfonds, the employer has a choice of five financing vehicles: direct 
commitments, support funds, Pensionskassen, Pensionsfonds, and direct insurance contracts. Of course the tax 
implications are different and vehicles may be reinsured in part or all. Direct commitments and support funds may be 
funded or un-funded.  The employer may also combine some or all of these vehicles in hybrids plans with defined 
contribution and defined benefit elements which deduct the benefits of one plan from the benefits of other plans in 
order to make the best use of whole framework.  
 
Sweden 
 
 Sweden has a long tradition of social insurance.  Sweden was the first nation to implement a mandatory 
government retirement system for all citizens.  The pension plan consists of National Basic Pension (BP) and National 
Supplementary Pension (ATM).   The old system was a tax-financed, pay-as-you-go entitlement program, similar to 
the United States‘ Social Security program. In addition, a second, earnings-related supplementary pension (ATP) was 
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available.  Similar to the U.S. Social security program, the supplementary pension provided old age benefits linked to 
each worker‘s earnings history. Like American system, the Swedish system has a trust fund that is supposed to invest 
surplus payroll taxes in order to pay benefits when baby-boomer generation retires.   
 
 The Swedish pension program faced financial problems similar to the troubles plaguing the U.S. Social 
Security system, and the Swedes decided in 1998 that partial privatization was the best solution.  Now workers must 
put 18.5 percent of their income aside retirement (split between employer and employee each with 9.25 percent) but 
they are now able to invest 2.5 percent points of that amount in an individual account.  The remaining 16 percent is a 
tax that funds the pay-as-you-go government program [Heritage Foundation 2000].      
 
Norway 
 
 Private pension plans are common in Norway in addition to the Social Security to bring up the total 
retirement pension up to a level of 60 percent to 70 percent of pay after 30-40 years‘ service.  Both the Social Security 
and defined benefit plans have the same retirement provision and policy rules [William M. Mercer Companies LLC 
2005].   
 
Finland 
 
 Finland has Social Security (National Pension) as well as defined benefit plans.  The Employees‘ Pension 
Act was passed in 1961 to supplement the National Pension Plan.   The supplementary plan completely funded by the 
employers, private or public, who paid contributions equal on average to about 10 percent of a worker‘s earnings, into 
fund managed by seven large insurance companies or set up funds on their own.  Self employed persons had to choose 
a fund [http://www.country-studies.com/finland/ national-pension-plan.htm].   
 
Netherlands  
 
 The pension system in Netherlands consists of three pillars – basic public pensions, occupational pensions, 
and individual pensions.  The state‘s basic pension program is a pay-as-you-go program.  Under this plan, all residents 
aged between 15 and 65 are obliged to pay 17.9 percent of their annual income as premiums.  The program provides 
all residents aged 65 and older with a flat rate pension benefit.  In addition, many people are covered by non-
mandatory occupational pensions formed through collective labor agreements between employees and employers. 
These pensions are based on a capital funding system, in which premiums are saved up and invested before being paid 
out.  The individual pensions are considered defined benefit and supplemental plan and it is on a voluntary basis.  This 
plan can be a part of the corporate pension plan or private plans [The Japan Times 2004]. 
 
Switzerland 
 
 Underlying the Swiss retirement system is the Federal Occupational retirement and Survivors‘ Insurance 
Scheme or AHV/AVS.   The first-tier social insurance program, established in 1948, provides basic old age and 
surviving dependants‘ benefits.  This is a program like the programs found in the United States (Social Security) and 
Canada (Canada Pension Plan) – pay-as-you-go.  The supplemental or a second-tier plan is known as BVG, since 
1985, requires that employees contribute to privately administering compulsory occupational schemes.  While the 
BVG system is effectively defined contribution (DC) based, many of the benefits actually paid exceed the minimum 
requirements and are formulated on a defined benefit (DB) basis.   Since 1995, like DB plans in the U.S., 
accountholders or contributors can withdraw funds from their pension plan to purchase residential property [Heritage 
Foundation 2000]. 
 
South Korea 
 
 South Korea is in the process of transition from old system of pay-as-you-go to a new system by 2006 in 
which the Korean workers can funnel their retirement funds into security market, and take advantage of economic and 
market growth, as well as, being responsible for their returns. Government would allow workers to choose between 
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defined benefits or defined contribution plans. Brokerage firms, banks, insurance companies and investment trust 
companies with solid financial records will be allowed to manage the pension funds. A company can choose between 
existing severance payment system and the new retirement pension plans or offer both [Korea.net 2004].       
 
Endnote 
____________________ 
1 The accounting continues to be controversial. FAS 87 has been updated with FAS 132.  The latest revision of FAS 132 was 
delayed because of the International Accounting Standard (IAS 19had not completed its ruling on pension accounting. 
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